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Industriel Relations and Technological 
Change : Swedish Trade Union 
and Employers' Views 
and Agreements 
Paul Malles 
c An intèrest organization which 
limite itself to guarding existing 
group interests risks becoming 
petrified in tradition and ïosing 
att influence over developments. 
On the other hand, if an organ-
ization accepts change and is 
able to integrate the group 
intèrest within the over-au pro-
cess of development, the aims 
of the organization wQl he 
accepted as progressive and the 
organization wiu hâve the pos-
sibility of actively influencing 
the course of the future. » * 
Over the last quarter of a century the issue of change has played 
a prédominant rôle in Swedish trade-union thinking. It has been the 
subject of carefully researched policy documents submitted to the pe-
riodic conventions of the Fédération. 
At the 1941 Congress of the Swedish Fédération of Trade Unions 
(LO) it was the changing rôle of the trade unions within the « weifare 
state » which was the centre of attention. The issue then was 
where to draw the line between the areas in which the parties 
on the labour market should and could act freely and in their 
own right, and the areas of éco-
nomie and social policy legitima-
tely assigned to government. 
MALLES, PAUL, Conseil Economique 
du Canada, Ottawa. 
* ( From the Introduction to the report on « The Trade Union Movement and 
Technological Change » to the 1966 Congress of the Swedish Fédérations of 
Trade Unions.) 
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Ten years later, in 1951, the emphasis had shifted to the problem 
o£ wage policies under conditions o£ full employment — in other words, 
how to divide responsibility between the trade unions and government 
in maintaining a balance among and between the social and économie 
forces in a full employment economy under inflationary pressures. And 
just as firmly as the unions previously had insisted on keeping the labour 
market free from state intervention, just as firmly did they now insist 
on the govemment's responsibility to maintain the « économie balance 
as a pre-condition for a wage détermination to be arrived at by nego-
tiations between free organizations ». The conclusion then drawn was 
that it was the task of government to introduce new stabilization policies, 
of which an active labour market policy was to become a new and 
important élément, while it was the task of the parties on the labour 
market to search for new forms and techniques of wage détermination. 
It was this which led to the system of centralized wage negotiations 
between the top labour and management organizations in an attempt 
to master the « trade-off » problem between full employment and price 
stability. 
Again ten years later, in 1961, the issue of a « co-ordinated economy » 
came into the foreground and with it the question of structural and 
technological change as an essential condition for stable économie growth 
and rising standards of living. Now the conclusion was that it was not 
sufficient for the unions merely to tolerate change as inévitable, but 
to promote change actively, if the Swedish economy was to remain 
internationally compétitive and at the same time able to fulfil the obli-
gations which Sweden had undertaken in providing aid to developing 
countries. 
There was also, however, another strong motivation for the unions 
to press actively for structural change and technological progress. Their 
so-called « wage solidarity policy » which had been introduced in the 
early fifies to minimize income différences between various groups of 
wage earners, had met with only limited success. This was ascribed to 
the disparities in the productivity growth of the various industrial 
seotors. The unions, therefore, insisted that a more active and coordi-
nated économie policy accompanied by intensified labour market policy 
measures to encourage the structural rationalization of the economy 
was not only necesary for maintaining a satisfactory and stable rate 
of growth, but also for achieving the aim of minimizing wage differen-
tials. 
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It was no coineidenee that the same LO Congress which discussed 
thèse questions should also take up a much older issue — industriel 
democracy — in other words, the rôle and function of the work force 
and its représentatives in the decision-making process at the enterprise 
level. If, so the argument ran, économie policies, including manpower 
and wage policies, were to aim at speeding up the process of change, 
the ensuing problems of manpower adjustment to change could only 
find satisfactory solutions through a continuous process of mutual infor-
mation and consultation between management, the work force and their 
unions. 
Trade Unions and Technological Change 
Having agreed that the unions had a responsibility in the promotion 
of change, the next logical steps was not only to accept the introduction 
of new production methods and with it the necessary organizational 
changes within the enterprise as a permanent and continuous process 
but also to be prepared to participate actively in this process. Such 
participation, the unions insisted, had to be conditional however on their 
ability and opportunity to protect the interests of the wage and salary-
earners under conditions of change — interests which in the union view 
went far beyond the merely material values, but had to encompass 
social and human values as well. 
Yet, there was little factual knowledge of the nature of change or 
of its effects on the labour force. To study thèse questions the LO 
Secrétariat appointed, at the end of 1962, a « Working Party », composed 
mainly of experts among its own research staff, and entrusted it with 
the task of preparing a repoit to the 1966 Congress of the LO. This 
report was published in May 1966, under the title « The Trade Union 
Movement and Technical Progress » 1 and was based upon a number of 
studies conceming various industries and enterprises as well as on a 
sample study of a cross-section of the LO membership (0.5 per cent or 
7,589 wage and salary-earners). 
The following paragraphs attempt to summarize the policy view-
points of this report in so far as they relate to our subject. 
*:• \'$m 
(1) RUDOLF MEIDER, ERIC PETTERSON et al.: Fackforeningsrorelsen och den 
Techniska Utvecklinngen, Rapport fran an arbetsgrupp till 1966 ars LO-kongress ; 
Bokforlaget Prisma, Stockholm. 
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Also in Sweden, despite full employment, the * automation » dis-
cussion had hitherto largely centred around the employment eiffects of 
« new technology » — a term preferred by the LO expert group to 
« automation » which it felt had lost in the public discussion much of 
its original meaning and moreover had become burdened with a good 
deal of emotionalism. 
On the basis of its own research as well as the findings of the 1965 
Long-Term Survey of the Swedish Economy2, the LO Working Party 
came to some basic conclusions, depending on a number of assiimptions 
— among them, « a purposeful full-employment policy, unimpaired 
competitiveness on world markets and f ree trade with ail counlTies » : 
(i) There is no direct connection between increases in productivity 
and employment. True, expérience has shown that relatively 
more manpower is freed in sectors which hâve shown the 
greatest increase in productivity and that the greatest expansion 
of employment occurs in the service sector, which is assumecl to 
hâve a low rate of productivity increase. Changes on the dernand 
side were, however, the décisive factor in such changes in the 
employment structure. 
(ii) There was no sign that Sweden was entering upon an era of 
technological révolution with productivity increasing by leaps 
and bounds. The statistical projections provided in the Long-
Term Survey do not envisage seething technological develop-
ments and radical structural-rationalization changes. 
(iii) Given the fact that the Swedish labour force is not expected to 
grow until 1980, scarcities in the supply of labour are more 
likely to develop rather than a net surplus, even in the event of 
a considérable speed-up in technological progress and structural 
change. 8 
(iv) Although the rate or tempo of change varies from sector to 
sector, this does not modify the over-all picture. It rather con-
firms the impression that technological change is only paît of 
an ail pervading but continuous process whose character does 
not vary in essentials from what went on before ; that the impact 
(2) The Swedish Economy 1966-1970 and the General Outlook for the Seventies, 
Published by the Ministry of Finance, Stockholm, 1966, (English Edition). 
(3) Since de latter part of 1966 the demand pressure for labour has somewhat 
lessened. This expressed itself in a décline in the number of unfilled jobs which 
in June 1967 was about 25 percent less than in the corresponding months of 1966. 
Also the number of registered unemployed has increased. Workers in retraining 
and engaged in the so-called emergency work projects are not counted as un-
employed. Both catégories hâve quite sharply increased during 1967. 
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of technological change on the employment situation is very 
limited and that no dramatic changes are to be expected in the 
forseeable future. 
At the same rime the LO Working Party, stressed the point that a 
high total level of employment can hide great variations between indus-
trial sectors, and that technological change, even without any major 
effect on the gênerai employment situation, may hâve dramatic consé-
quences on individual enterprises, branches of industry, géographie 
régions and individuals. A full-employment policy must therefore be 
complemented by sélective measures of active labour market, relocation 
and training policies4. 
Concerning technological change, as such, the Working Party main-
tained that it was impossible to isolate « technology » from ail other 
factors producing change. Any such attempts were already difficult in 
the realm of theory, but were impossible if applied to practicaî situations. 
This did not make it meaningless to discuss the manpower effects of 
technological change in individual cases. However, the Working Party 
vvarned against restricting the discussion to such effects alone. Change 
must be seen as a total complex regardless of whether or not it could 
be traced directly to « new technology ». 
The Rôle of the Work Force/ its Représentation 
and the Individual 
The LO Working Party arrived at a number of propositions con-
cerning the rôle of the work force, the individual and the trade unions 
under conditions of change which led it straight to the question of work 
force influence on managerial décisions: 
1. Technological and structural changes were not the object of 
eternal « natural Iaws ». In every situation there loas a choice 
(4) The LO Congress of 1966 adopted on the basis of the report of the Working 
Party a trade union action programme which among others cafied for a reform or 
labour market policies. Such a programme was presented to the government in 
June 1967 requesting a substantial increase in the budget of the Labour Market 
Board responsible for labour market policy with 1 per cent of the administrative 
budget going into research, suggesting improvements in the opérations of the 
employment service taking into account more individuel needs, major improvements 
in transfer and mobility allowances and a radical reform and expansion of adult 
training and retraining, as well as unified planning and administrtion of the various 
kinds of public measures to create employment and expansion of régional develop-
ment plans. Subsequently the Swedish Government increased the budget of the 
Labor Market Board by 40 percent. 
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of varions alternatives. Such choices depended in the final 
analysis on the norms and values existing in the society as a 
whole. « The concept of the importance of work for the satis-
faction of the individual and of his social adjustment will in-
fluence his work tasks and work environment ». 
2. It is the individual who must be the centre of attention and two 
factors must be balanced against each other — the adjustment 
problem posed for the individual and the possible gain in éco-
nomie efficiency. 
3. The effects of change cannot be discussed without also taking 
into considération the decision-making process. Management 
décisions on technological and organizational changes can radi-
cally influence the material and social position of the employée. 
« Wage and salary-earners are, therefore, entitled to demand 
from management information about envisagea or possible 
changes at a point in time and of sufficient content that they 
can use this information for evaluating their own situation, judge 
the effects for themselves, and act accordingly. » 
4. Information, however, is not enough. There must also be the 
opportunity for the employées and their organizations to exert 
their influence on the way in which changes are to be carried 
out, as well as on their results. Consequently it is désirable, that 
.trade unions increase their influence on enterprise poiicy, or-
ganization, employaient poiicy and conditions of empJoyment 
within the enterprise in gênerai. « The traditional trade union 
aim for increased democratization of industrial life is, therefore, 
as topical as ever. » 
5. Managerial décisions of many kinds, such as major investment 
projects or plant shut-downs, usually hâve far-reaching chain 
effects within the community. Those who make such décisions 
cannot be equally interested in ail the détails of the chain, nor 
carry the sole responsibility for ail their effects. Manpower 
problems hâve to be taken in hand by the labour market autho-
rities, social institutions, trade unions and partly by the enter-
prises themselves. Increased advance planning, intensified co-
opération and consultation, and provisions by which the interests 
of individual employées are to be safeguarded are strongly 
called for. 
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Industrial Democracy: A Perennial Topic 
Within the context of this article, we may note specially the remark 
of the LO Working Party that the traditional demand of the Swedish 
trade unions for democratization of industrial life was as topical as ever. 
Indeed the issue is an old one and has been on and off the agenda of 
the trade union movement and its political ally, the Social-Democratic 
Party, for many décades. Immediately following the First World War 
though, « économie democracy », never a clearly defined term, was 
primarily seen as a corollary to parliamentary democracy only together 
with which true « social democracy » could be established. C. D. Cole's 
* guild socialism », for example, which at that time had caught the 
imagination of the British labour movement, also had ardent supporters 
among the leading circles of Swedish socialism and trade unionism and 
even the influence of the original « soviet » or « council » idea was not 
vvholly absent. When the long, and now for over 35 years almost un-
interrupted, rule of the Social Démocratie Party, to which the large 
majority of Swedish industrial unions are organically linked, appeared 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of political power over the economy, 
the issue narrowed down more specifically to the question of increased 
employée influence at the enterprise level as a more appropriate trade 
union objective. That, it has largely remained up to now, although the 
ideological aspects hâve recently corne again more info the foreground, 
especially among the younger membership. 
It is quite typical of the pragmatic approach of the Swedish trade 
union movement that for many years it has not tried to challenge 
management on a broad ideological front. What could be called a 
« management rights » clausea has been retained in the by-laws of the 
employers' Confédération specifying that management must hâve the 
right to hire and fire and to lead and alloeate work as it deems fit. Yet 
over the years the unions hâve succeeded, step for step, in obtaining 
concessions as the need to solve immédiate problems arose, which 
considerably increased their influence in thèse very areas. 
(5) The issue goes back to a very early « understanding » between the SAF and 
the LO reached during the first décade of this century, by which the unions conceded 
to the employers, in addition to the right of hiring and firing, also the employment 
of organized or unorganized labour at will. In exchange the SAF guaranteed to the 
unions full freedom of organization. The question of trade union récognition and 
union security has played, therefore, no major rôle in the history of Swedish labour-
management relations. For many years afterwards, however, the management rights 
clause as to hirings and firings remained a major source of friction. 
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At the same rime, it became the distinction of the Swedish industrial 
relations system to rely to the least possible degree on législation, but 
to strive for an orderly process of négociations and the necessary maehi-
nery for the solution of conflicts through voluntary agreement between 
the central organizations of both parties on the labour market.c It 
should be noted hère, though, that unless thèse central agreements 
solely concern the relations and joint activities of the top organizations 
of labour and management, they are not in themselves binding on their 
affiliâtes but are in fact recommendations to them and become collective 
agreements in the meaning of the law only after having been agreed 
to by the organizations at the industry level. 
The history of thèse central agreements can be traced back to the 
first décade of this century. It is, however, only since 1938, when the 
Swedish Employers Confédération (SAF) and the Trade Union Confé-
dération (LO) reached their famour « Basic Agreement », that central 
agreements hâve become the means of progressively building an insti-
tutional framework of labour-management relations encompassing an 
ever-widening range of interests. It is significant that the Basic Agree-
ment followed upon décades of intense struggle and considérable 
industrial unrest and was in fact the conséquence of threatened govern-
ment intervention which both parties tried strenuously to avoid then and 
hâve tried to avoid ever since. 
Nevertheless, the gênerai acceptance of the Basic Agreement was 
even then by no means assured and its future rôle as the cornerstone of 
the Swedish industrial relations system hardly foreseen. Even after 
several years a most knowledgeable writer on the Swedish collective 
bargaining system could still speak of the Basic Agreement as merely 
« a new winkle in Swedish negotiation machinery and procédures » and 
doubt whether it would constitute an important permanent addition to 
collective bargaining in Sweden.7 The fact that it did, may perhaps be 
no less due to external pressures that was the Agreement itself, keeping 
in mind that it was signed at the eve of World War II which enforced 
( 6 ) Sharp distinction is being made between « conflicts of rights » arising from 
the interprétation of existing agreements, questions whether such agreements con-
form to the Collective Agreements Act and other points of law that are subject 
to judicial procédures (Labor Court Act of 1928) and « conflicts of interest » 
which remain the sole concern of the parties themselves but are open to voluntary 
médiation procédures. 
(7) PAUL H. NORGREN, The Swedish Collective Bargaining System, Harvard 
University Press, 1941, pp. 313-14. 
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a régime of national unity on the country and was followed by the needs 
of post-war reconstruction. 
From the point of view of the trade union membership, perhaps 
the most important immédiate aspect of the Basic Agreement was that 
in undertaking, among others, to give advance notice to the unions on 
dismissals, layoffs and rehirings, management accepted restrictions on 
its traditional right to freely hire and fire. From the point of view of 
the future development of a continuous and permanent relationship 
between management and labour organizations, however, the most im-
portant aspect was undoubtedly the development of step-for-step pro-
cédures from the enterprise level upwards for ironing out différences 
before resulting in open conflict with final recourse to a joint body — 
the Labour Market Council,8 while at the same time providing the 
opportunity to separate and enlarge areas of common interests by con-
tinuing negotiation. 
As illustrated by the following chart, the évolution of this institu-
tional framework of labour-management relations founded upon the 
« Basic Agreement » was by no means a rapid one. It took more than 
a décade and has ail the signs of cautious testing. 
What interests us hère is, above ail, the fact that the instruments 
chosen to increase employée influence on managerial décisions affecting 
the labour force, were not the collective wage agreements but the central 
agreements arrived at separately from periodical collective bargaining 
with its crisis atmosphère and time limitations. 
« The Swedish collective bargaining agreements contain, therefore, in 
gênerai no provisions which give the employées co-determination rights 
over work methods and organization within the enterprise... The 
Swedish trade union movement has instead sought to approach thèse 
and other questions in connection with technological and organizational 
change within the enterprises in another way, namely, through co-
opération and consultation with the management side. » 9 
(8) The body which originally negotiated the Basic Agreement was the Labour 
Market Committee. In practice its functions were taken over by the Labour Market 
Council as a création of the Agreement. Both should be distinguished from the 
Labour Market Board which is a public agency concerned with manpower questions. 
(9) Fackfareningsrorelsen och den Techniska Utvecklingen, p. 205. 
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L A B O R M A R K E T C O M M I T T E E 
SAF-LO ; 
SAF-TCO-Affiliates 
Basic Agreements : 
To safeguard self-go-
vernment of the par-
ties on the labour 
market and the em-
ployées* job security. 
1938 
Labour Market 
Council 
Notifying 
Organisation 
SAF-LO 
Agreement on Safety 
at Work: 
To provide for safety 
at the work place. 
1942 
Joint Industrial 
Safety Council 
Joint Executive 
Bureau 
Joint Branch 
Safety Committees 
Workers* Safety 
Représentatives 
resp. Works Councils 
SAF-LO ; 
SAF-TCO-Affiliates 
Agreement on 
Vocational Training : 
To establish rules con-
cerning training in 
industry. 
1944 
Joint Industrial 
Training and 
Guidance Council 
Joint Executive 
Bureau 
Joint Branch 
Training Committee 
1 
Works Councils resp. 
Works Représentatives 
SAF-LO 
Agreement on Time 
and Motion Studies 
To promote a sound 
and mutually accept-
ableable practice of 
Time and Motion Stu-
dies. 
j 1948 
Joint Time and 
Motion Study Council 
Joint Time and 
Motion Study 
Committees 
Works Councils 
and Trade Unions 
SAF-LO 
Report on Women 
in Employment 
To promote the well-
being of women in 
employment. 
1951 
Joint Council for 
Women Worker's 
Questions 
| Joint Executive 
Bureau 
_ i 
Works Councils 
and Trade Unions 
Evolut ion of the Ins t i tu t iona l F r a m e w o r k of Labour — Managemen t Co-operat ion in Sweden ( C o n t ' d . ) 
L A B O R M A R K E T C O M M I T T E E 
SAF-LO; SAF-TCO 
Agreements on Works Councils 
and Works Représentatives 
To promote workers' représentation 
and labour management co-operation 
at the entreprise level. 
1 (1946:1958:1964) 
1966 
SAF-LO-TCO 
Agreement on Labour-Management 
Co-operation in Enterprise 
To guide Works Council Activities 
and other forms of labour-manage-
ment co-operation at the company 
level. 
1966 
Labour Market Council and 
Development Council on 
Co-operation Questions 
Development Council 
on 
Co-operation Questions 
SAF-LO-TCO 
Représentatives 
Industry Asocsiations 
and 
Trade Unions 
Works Councils resp. 
Works Représentatives and 
local organizations 
Industry Associations 
and 
Trade Unions 
Works Councils resp. 
Works Représentatives and 
local organizations 
SAF-LO 
Agreement on Training of 
Works Council Membership 
To promote and finance educational 
activities on co-operation questions in 
the enterprise. 
1966 
Development Council 
on 
Co-operation Questions 
Industry Associations 
and 
Trade Unions 
Works Councils resp. 
Works Représentatives and 
local organizations 
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New Central Agreements 
There is little doubt that the Swedish trade unions during more 
than three décades of Social-Democratic rule would hâve had sufficient 
political power for an attempt to realize their aim of increasing the 
influence of the work force on management by législative means. Why 
did they choose not to do so ? The most persuasive and telling argument 
has been that législation « could only count on a passive and formai 
adhérence to the provisions of the law, while a voluntary agreement can 
count on the parties' support and engagement in realizing the ideas and 
aims which are contained in and lie behind tlie agreement ».10 Ob-
viously the preconditions for this are strongly and evenly balanced 
organized forces on both sides. 
There are, according to the Swedish trade union view, two ways 
by which « increased democratization » at the enterprise level can be 
achieved: 
1) by organized co-operation between enterprise management and 
the elected représentatives of the workers organized in the trade 
unions; and 
2) by the employée obtaining influence on his own job situation 
and job task from a democratically engaged management. 
The first method demands formai « rules of the game », in other 
words, formai àgreements which are upheld by the organized parties 
within the enterprise. The other method dépends on rather intangible 
matters such as attitudes and communications. As expérience hais shown 
in Sweden, neither method can stand by itself; they are complementary 
and not contradictory. 
The first attempt to bring about a solution to the problem was the 
Works Council Agreements of 1946, but the results were by no means 
satisfactory. After 15 years of efforts on the part of the organizations 
on both sides it had to be admitted that the contribution of thèse joint 
bodies at the enterprise level had made only an insignificant contribution 
to labour-management relations. The three organizations that were 
parties to thèse agreements, began separate studies of the Works Council 
(10) Article by Ole Gunnarsson in Fackforeningsrorehen, No. 11, 1965. 
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opérations in the early sixties.X1 As was to be expected, none of thèse 
studies could corne to definite conclusions. The employers' study, 
although by no means denying the weaknesses of the Works Councils, 
showed that employées in enterprises with less than 50 employées, which, 
generally speaking, had no Works Councils, received much less inform-
mation than those in larger enterprises where the Councils were more 
common. On the other hand the trade union studies showed that, even 
where Works Councils existed, information and consultation activities 
were relatively limited and gave the employées little opportunity to exert 
influence on managerial décisions. 
Most disturbing, from the union point of view, was the fact that 
in three-fourths of the cases under study the employées complained 
that they were informed of major changes in opérations and working 
conditions only after managerial décisions had been taken and there was 
little consultation and co-operation. Expérience also had shown that the 
Works Councils were regarded in many enterprises as an extraneous 
rather than an intégral élément in the enterprise's administration. They 
had little or no influence on personnel policy and personnel administra-
tion. Many of the Works Councils did not meet as regularly as 
prescribed in the Agreement and very often employers refused to 
comply with requests for information and consultation in questions which 
were not expressively defined in the Agreement, but had a bearing on 
employment conditions. Both labour had management studies pointed 
at the need for a closer association of the local union with the Works 
Councils. 
On the basis of thèse studies, the LO unions came to the conclusion 
that it was no longer sufficient to amend the Agreement piecemeal but 
that a new Agreement was désirable. They also felt that there was a 
definite need for better training of the persons who were to work locally 
in the Works Councils. 
In conséquence, the LO requested in May 1965, new negotiations 
and formulated a 20-point programme intended to increase the influence 
of the work force, through their trade-union représentation, on the com-
(11) Samarbetet i Framtidens Fotetag, Betankandet avgivet av SAF;s Referens-
grupp for Arbetslivets Demokratisering, Broderna Lagerstrom AB, Stockholm, 1965. 
Fackforeninsroselsen och Foretagsdemokratin, LO Foretagsutredningen, Tidens 
Forlag, Stockholm, 1961. 
Tjanstemannen och Foretagsnamnderna, Rapport avgiven av TCOs arbetgrupp 
for foretagsnamnfragor; Stockholm, 1964. 
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pany management. Above ail, hère too, we find the same dernand for 
advance information and consultation on change, which seems to hâve 
become a universal trade-union goal. 
Management Attitudes 
The Employers' Confédération agreed to open negotiations on a 
new Works Council Agreement, but there was at first, little to indicate 
the line they would take. Nevertheless there seemed to be a certain 
concern on the employers' side that the unions would raise the issue of 
co-determination in the more direct form of participation in management, 
as may be seen from the following summary of a section of the Report 
of the Référence Group to whom the SAF had entnisted a preliminary 
study of the matter: 
« The rôle of the trade-union movement with regard to the balance of 
interests which can be said to exist on the Swedish labour market is 
probably clear to everyone. It is more difficult to détermine how the 
trade-union movement would best be able to assist in securing increased 
contentaient at work for the individual worker. In this case too it 
would probably be advisable to foliote the prineiple that the trade-
union movement should act as the organization of an interested party 
which puts claims forward but leaves it to the specialists in the Com-
pany management to choose methods of satisfying those claims. 
« The difficulty arises, however, that such claims cannot be given a 
gênerai form, as the needs of the employées are very diverse... It is no 
easy matter in such a situation to advance demands and claims to the 
company on behalf of the collective body. A way that immediately 
suggests itself would be, therefore, for the trade-union movement to 
demand that its représentatives should take an active part in the 
management of the company. In the view of the Référence Group, 
such a way out would not solve the problem, one reason being that 
the assignaient of jobs and the création of the conditions in which 
they are to be carried out are complicated tasks for specialists. With 
regard to the rôle of the trade unions the Référence Group cornes to 
the conclusion that in the field of co-operation the distribution of func-
tions between the company management and the trade-union repré-
sentatives should be the same as that which prevails in other respects, 
the trade-union movement formulating claims but leaving it to the 
company management to choose the methods of satisfying them. 
As a natural conséquence of the fact that local co-operation is made 
part of the administration of the company, the management bears 
most of the responsibility for the further development of co-operation 
and the realization of the objective referred to in the report, it is 
emphasized that the responsibility of the management to ail interested 
parties must not be confused with the question of the appointaient of 
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company executives. This function must... devolve exclusively on the 
owners. » 12 
Concerning the future development of labour-management co-
opération, the Employers* group recommended that the Swedish Em-
ployers' Confédération (SAF) should seek, together with the employées' 
organizations, common ground in an agreement on gênerai principles 
with regard to the objectives towards which co-operation should be 
direoted. It was further proposed that an active effort should be made 
by the SAF to increase the facilities for adjustment to work and job 
satisfaction. The SAF should work for the establishment of institutions 
for labour-management co-operation adapted to needs of particular 
companies, by means of experiments with such institutions and by other 
methods. The SAF should also help to ensure that a company-adopted 
code for effective personnel administration be developed and that the 
work devoted to the solution of co-operation questions be made to benefit 
company administration as a whole. The SAF should help take steps 
to reduce antagonism between owners and employées. More should be 
done in the field of training and research. In this connection the group 
advocated the setting up of a « spécial council for co-operation ques-
tions » with the task of creating a basis for further development of 
co-operation by means of advice, training and research. 
The outcome of the négociations between the SAF on the employers' 
side and the LO and TCO on the other was the conclusion at the end 
of August 1966, of three new central agreements closely linked in thought 
and purpose: 
i) a new Works Council Agreement replacing the original agree-
ment of 1946, separately concluded between the SAF and the 
LO, and SAF and TCO (Central Organization of Salaried Em-
ployées); 
ii) an Agreement for the Promotion of Labour-Management Co-
opération Within Enterprises which seeks to establish and define 
the objectives of co-operation at the company level and includes 
( 12 ) Co-operation in the Company of the Future, Report of the SAF's Référence 
Group for the Democratization of Industrial Life; English Summary, pp. 16-17. 
This concern of the SAF Référence Group proved to be quite unfounded. Com-
menting editorially on a récent suggestion by individual employers to invite 
employée représentation into management, the LO organ « Fackforeningsrorelsen » 
states in the issue No. 23, 1967 : « For good reasons the trade union movement 
has remained sceptical in regard to représentation within management », 
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the establishment of a new central joint organ under the same 
of « Development Council for Co-operation Questions ». This 
was not only a completely new venture but also the first under-
taking in the field of labour-management relations jointly 
sponsored by the SAF, LO and TCO; 
iii) an LO-SAF Agreement in the form of a joint statement recom-
mending that the training of the Works Council membership 
becomes part of the company cost structure. 
The différence between the Works Council Agreement and the Co-
operation Agreement is, among other, that the former has to be ratified 
by the national unions (fédérations) and the corresponding industry 
associations affiliated to the central organization and, in this way, is the 
basis for collective agreements under the Collective Agreement Act, 
while the latter establishes gênerai guidelines, but in its operational 
provisions concerns primarily the three national centres. The third 
agreement in turn is to be worked out in détail in negotiations between 
the national unions and employers' associations at the industry level. 
The New Works Council Agreement 
Works Councils in Sweden are established in enterprises which, as 
a rule, employ more than 50 people. In enterprises with less than 50 
but more than nine workers, the local trade-union organization may 
décide to arrange for the appointaient of two représentatives (ombud), 
in firms with less than nine workers, one such représentative. 
The initiative for the création of a Works Council may corne either 
from the management or the local union side. As joint bodies the 
management members are appointed by management, the labour mem-
bers elected by the work force under rules established by the local trade 
union. Periods of office may vary from a minimum of two to a maximum 
of four years. There are spécial rules concerning the représentation 
of clérical personnel and the numerical distribution of the labour repré-
sentation is in gênerai to reflect the composition of the work force. 
The number of employée représentatives may vary from a maximum 
of five for units with less than 100 employées to a maximum of 11 for 
those with more than 200 employées. Eligible for membership in the 
Councils are ail employées after one year of employ ment with the firm. 
In addition, the Councils may invite experts to participate in their deli-
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berations if warranted by the issues on hand. Such experts may corne 
from the ranks of the employées themselves but also from outside the 
firm. 
The Councils are the meet at least every quarter-year, but may be 
called into session more often if warranted and desired by either party. 
Moreover, in larger firms, there may be a permanent working committee 
of the Council, as well as sub-committees dealing with spécial areas of 
the CounciTs work. 
The Chairman of the union local (factory club) is required to be a 
member of the Council. This, as well as the provision that Works 
Councils may be instituted on the initiative of the local trade-union 
organization and that the élection rules are in the compétence of the 
union, corresponds to the concept of the new Agreement which defines 
the Works Councils as « organs for information and consultation between 
management and the work force through their trade-union organization 
within the enterprise ». In this way the new Agreement seeks to clarify 
the rôle and position of the local union vis-à-vis the Works Councils. 
It was recognized that unless the local union is directly engaged in the 
Works Councils at the plant level, and, unless the local management 
recognizes the union not solely as a negotiating party but as an instru-
ment of co-operation in the plant, the best intentions of the organizations 
ci both parties at the national and industry level do not suffice to bring 
the objectives of the Agreement to fruition. It is noteworthy that this 
clarification of the trade-union rôle in the Works Councils was not due 
solely to the union demand, but was strongly favoured by the employers' 
Référence Group. 
The Works Councils are to hâve as their objective the furthering 
of « increased productivity and job satisfaction (arbetstillfredsstâllelse). 
Thus from the outset, the new Agreement tries to recognize the 
direct relationship between productivity and the sensé of well-being and 
belonging, essential to the work force as a collective as well as to indi-
viduals. 
More specifically the councils are to: 
— maintain continuons co-operation between management and 
the work force; 
— give the work force insight into the économie and technical 
situation of the enterprise and its profitability; 
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— work for security in employment, safety and the well-being of 
the employées; 
— promote training within the enterprise; and 
— in gênerai further good working conditions and a good work 
atmosphère. 
While the Swedish Works Councils under the new Agreement remain 
primarily consultative organs, management may delegate to the Council 
rights of décision in certain limited areas, such as « social questions » 
within a given budget. There is also a clear effort to build the councils 
into the regular administrative machinery of the enterprise and to make 
it an organic part of the decision-making process. The Agreement, 
therefore, carefully defines information and consultation as advance 
information and advance consultation. For this purpose a new section 
(para. 6) was put into the new Agreement that was not found in the 
previous versions: 
« It is essential in utilizing the expérience and insights of the 
employées, that the questions about which the councils are to be 
informée! and are subject of consultation, must be questions which 
are essential for the enterprise and its personnel. It follows from the 
nature of such consultation that it précèdes the décisions of manage-
ment and cornes hefore possible changes hâve taken place. By mana-
gement is meant not only the executive management but the Board 
of Directors and shareholders. In the process of consultation, the 
councils should seek to arrive at a consensus. 
The results of the Councils' délibérations are to be reported regularly 
to persons in management who deal with the issue at hand by a repré-
sentative appointed for this purpose by the employer. Once manage-
ment has arrived at a décision which is important to the employées, 
it is to be transmitted to the councils, especially if the topic has been 
treated beforehand by the council. » 
Exempted from the obligation of information and consultation are 
certain situations, where the information may be of a damaging character 
to the employer. However, even in such cases the employer should, in 
deciding whether or not to make the information available, take into 
considération the interest of the employées. For added security, there 
is a secrecy clause in the Agreement according to which no member 
of a council may reveal or make use of any technical or business inform-
ation to which he had become a party in his capacity as a council 
member when he is aware that it concerns a trade or business secret, or 
which the employer désignâtes as of confidential nature. This obligation 
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to secrecy continues even after an employée has left the services of the 
company or ceases to be a member of a Works Council. 
Areas of information and consultation are to be: 
a) Matters of production; i.e., technology, organization, planning 
and development. It is incumbent upon management to provide 
continuing information in thèse matters and to account for 
probable as well as effected changes. The employée members 
hâve the right of suggestion. 
b) Economie questions; in this area the employer shall provide 
information regarding the business situation, market changes, 
cost faotors of production and marketing prospects. Such inform-
ation should be prognostic and given in such a way that the 
council can itself form a good idea of the company's financial 
standing and future. 
In the case of joint stock companies and « économie associations » 
(e.g., co-operatives) the company is obliged to make available 
to the council the same information as given to the Board of 
Directors and shareholders (membership meeting). 
Also in this area the employée représentatives hâve the right uf 
proposai. 
c) Personnel administration; there too a completely new section 
(para. 10) has been introduced giving the employées increased 
influence on personnel administration: 
« The employées hâve a justified interest to hâve insight into the 
gênerai personnel policy of the enterprise and in the handling 
of personnel questions which concern that group of employées 
to which they belong. In the first place, this interest is to be 
satisfied by continuing contact between the management and 
union représentatives. 
However, as to gênerai guidelines on personnel policies, such as 
a) principles and methods of recruitment, choice and promotion; 
b) planning of recruitment and training; 
c) development of induction programmes, and 
d) principles for transfer or retraining of older and handicapped 
workers, as well as transfer of personnel in connection with 
284 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 23, No. 2 
structural changes, information should be given and consul-
tation should take place in the Works Councils. Information 
should also, if possible, be provided concerning personnel 
statistics, such as on health conditions, absence because of 
sicknes, accidents, turnover, recrutaient situation, etc. ». 
In the case of shut-downs or major curtailments in a firm's opér-
ations, consultation is to take place in the councils concerning 
their effects on employment conditions. Whenever an enterprise 
notifies the public authorities of such measures the councils are 
to be informed and kept informed about further developments. 
The job security provisions, provisions concerning dismissal and 
lay-offs, notice of termination of employment, etc., were taken 
over unchanged from the old to the new Agreement. Thèse 
cases are, under certain conditions, subject to notification to the 
union concerned and are open in the final instance to médiation 
by the Labour Market Council as the central joint body formed 
by représentatives of the national organizations.1S 
Agreement on Co-operation Questions at the Enterprise Level 
As indicated earlier, it was the employers' Référence Group which 
had suggested that the SAF should seek common ground for an agree-
ment on gênerai principles with regard to the objectives of labour-
management co-operation at the enterprise level and that a spécial 
organ be established for the development of such co-operation. Thus, 
the second of the three new central agreements actually originated with 
the employers. As an SAF spokesman told the writer, « We aie aware 
that the union side attaches great importance to the Works Council 
Agreement. For us the Co-operation Agreement is the more important 
one ». 
The new « Development Council for Co-operation Questions » is 
to consist of 10 members, of which five are delegated by the SAF, three 
by the LO and two by the TCO (Central Organization of Salaried Em-
(13) In the June 1967 Programme on Labour Market Policies the LO stated that 
it would like « the Labour Market Board to initiate negotiations with the organiza-
tions on the Labour Market and in industrv concerning a longer period of advance 
warning of shut-downs and major dismissal, methods and measures (a social plan) 
for the adjustment of workers on such occasions, and more extensive reporting to 
the employment offices of internai changes within firms and anticipated future 
labour requirements. The period of notice perscribed in the Works Council's Agree-
ment ought to be extended when the Agreement is revised in the near future ». 
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ployees). It is in fact the first agreement between labour and manage-
ment in Sweden which is jointly signed and créâtes a joint organ of ail 
three organizations. 
The purpose of this new central body is to follow attentively the 
developments in labour-management co-operation and to work for con-
tinuing improvement of this co-operation within the individual compa-
nies. The areas in which the Development Council by its own activity 
and through other organs should assist the enterprises and the parties 
on the labour market are to be: 
a) training of persons within the enterprises who are occupied with 
co-operation questions; 
b) préparation and distribution of material to be used within the 
enterprises in matters of training and schooling in thèse ques-
tions; 
c) information and counselling services concerning various co-oper-
ation forms; 
d) scientific research in regard to co-operation questions. 
Moreover, the Development Council will take over from the Labour 
Market Council the task of furthering and guiding the activities of the 
Works Councils and the Works Représentatives. 
Apart from the création of this new central body, the Agreement 
opens two new avenues of development. Firstly: the présent institutional 
System of labour-management co-operation, having grown up in piece-
meal fashion and being divided between various joint bodies (Labour 
Market Council, Industrial Safety Council, Time and Motion Study 
Council, Council for Womens' Questions and now the Development 
Council), may need better co-ordination of ail thèse activities, both as 
far as the agreements are concerned as well as in their institutional 
forms. Secondly: although the Co-operation Agreement takes the Works 
Council Agreement as its « natural base » and indeed covers largely 
the same ground, it stresses the point that in gênerai those institutional 
arrangements of labour-management co-operation will be most success-
ful which are most easily related to the particular administrative 
structure of a company, whereby size, production methods and industrial 
branch are some of the factors to be taken into account. The parties 
at the local level may, therefore, be left to develop institutional arran-
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gements which widen the area of co-operation within the enterprise, 
complément the Works Council Agreement or even replace it altogether, 
provided agreement can be reached between the compétent bodies at 
the Fédération level. It will then be the task of the new Development 
Council to do research and to assist the individual firms and unions in 
finding the forms best suited to their spécifie requirements. 
Regardless of the institutional arrangements which may be chosen 
in individual cases, the Co-operation Agreement reaffirms and seeks to 
redefine the purpose of the Works Council as well as the purpose of ail 
labour-management co-operation. As the Works Council Agreement 
slates, this purpose is twofold: increased productivity and increased 
contentment at tvork. Thèse two aims are closely related, but « each 
is also désirable in its own right ». 
Increased Productivity is defined in thèse guidelines not only as an 
économie but also a social objective: 
« Modem society demands for its existence effective and well equipped 
production machinery in which human and material resources are co-
ordinated to achieve the best production results while also taking into 
account those who participate in the production process. To create 
such effective production machinery is in the common interest of ail. 
« However, high productivity in the enterprise of a dynamic society 
also demands that ail those involved are prepared to accept and parti-
cipate in the changes of the enterprise structure, acquire, if necessary, 
new knowledge and skills, but also to hâve regard for the employées' 
need of information, consultation, training and security in employment. 
« Increased contentment at tvork in its turn demands that the individual 
is actually assigned work which he considers interesting and meanmg-
ful. 
« As an objective this means not only a satisfactory environment, but 
also meeting other demands which concern the work itself. An enter-
prise is not only hère to produce goods and services but must also 
strive to hâve this done in such a way that the knowledge and skill 
of the employées are hrought into play to the fullest extent possible. 
« In this regard, management must pay particular attention to the job 
content of each individual's task and to the choice of persons for each 
task. As far as possible, each worker should hâve the opportunity of 
contributing to the development of his own job situation. » 
While thèse two objectives of labour-management co-operation could 
be agreed upon by the parties concerned, a third objective — « balance 
of interests » — suggested by the employers was strongly resisted by 
the unions. 
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As the SAF Référence Group frankïy stated, this third objective 
could be regarded as a reply to the employées' demands for increased 
influence in the enterprise. They argued as follows: 
« The development of the enterprise is affected — and will be affected 
even more in the future — by the claims of a whole séries of interested 
parties such as customers, suppliers, creditors, owners, employées, the 
community at large, public opinion and the company's management. 
The last mentioned, however, is an involved party with a spécial 
status whose duty it is to balance the demands of the other parties 
in order to achieve adéquate freedom of action and to maintain the 
profitability without which the enterprise cannot survive. » 
By définition such a balance of interests exists if: 
« a) there is a common set of values in the society in which the 
company opérâtes, this meaning, among other things, that there are 
generally acknowledged standards as to how the results of the com-
pany's trading are to be distributed — standards whereby it may 
be ascertained which demands on the part of the interested parties 
are legitimate ones ; and 
« b) every group can ensure that its legitimate demands are satis-
ffed. » 
While a wholly satisfactory balance of interests may be difficult to 
achieve, this should not prevent employers and employées from working 
together to realize it. 
« It is important in this respect that the company management should 
be well aware of the common standards of value mentioned above, 
and that it should also be conscious, when exercising its 'mediatory 
rôle', of its responsibilities to ail interested parties... 
« ...a satisfactory balance of interests is probably an important prere-
quisite for the avoidance of acute conflicts, for example in the form 
of strikes. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume that a satis-
factory balance of interests favourably affects conditions within the 
companies and thereby increases both productivity and profitabi-
lity. » 14 
The union negotiators rejected outright the « balance of interest » 
concept as an objective of labour-management co-operation. They saw 
(14) « Co-operation in the Company of the Future », pp. 6-7. 
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ÏÏX this proposai simply an attempt to submerge the spécial employer-
employée relationship amongst a host of other and much less well 
defined relationships with management playing a « mediatory rôle », a 
function from which the employées and their organizations would be 
excluded and before which they could appear only as claimants amongst 
other claimants. 
Training of Works Council Members 
Twenty years of expérience with the Swedish Works Council system 
hâve shown that its objectives cannot be expected to be realized simply 
by concluding an agreement, however spécifie in its provisions. Positive 
interest on the part of management and of the work force and its repré-
sentatives is an obvious prerequisite, but even this is not enough. The 
communication techniques necessary to make the Agreement work as 
well as the knowledge of the complicated issues of économie, production 
and personnel policies which may be involved cannot be acquired by 
empirical means only. If information and consultation are to become 
meaningful instruments of labour-management co-operation within the 
plant a considérable amount of schooling is required. 
In connection with the « 20-point programme » which the LO sub-
mitted to the SAF at the beginning of the negotiations for the new 
Works Council Agreement, the trade union centre suggested that the 
question of schooling the Works Council members should also be a 
matter of agreement because it involved both time and cost questions: 
« Local trade unionists hâve often argued that it is not possible for 
workers after a full day of work to manage in their spare time the 
educational requirements as intensively as désirable. If questions of 
this kind are to be solved, they hâve to become part of regular company 
life. Such educational activities hâve to be accepted as productive 
work, which as to the time consumed and the costs involved hâve to 
enter into the company's cost calculations. » 15 
The employers' Référence Group having corne to similar conclusions, 
there was no difficulty in reaching an agreement on the lines suggested 
by the LO. 
« Concerning instruction material, instructors and localities the çosts 
will be borne by the companies especially in cases where such training 
(15) Fackforeninsrorelsen, No. 11/1965, p. 66; Spécial Print, page 11. 
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is part of the company's regular personnel training programme. In 
regard to other costs, such as, for example, compensation for lost 
vvorking time and travelling, directives will be issued after discussions 
hâve taken place between employer associations and union fédérations 
in each industry. In thèse discussions the interest of each company 
should be carefully considered. This, under certain circumstances, may 
lead to recommendations that the total costs be borne by the companies 
concerned. » 16 
The Development Council will in any case actively co-operate in 
the préparation of instruction material and plan for residential courses, 
study circles and conférences. 
In addition the organization will carry on their own internai training 
activities. On the union side it is fully recognized that the correct ap-
plication of the Works Council Agreement will, to the Iargest extent, 
dépend upon the proper training of the Works Council membership. 
A Temporary Compromise 
The Swedish trade-union movement looks at the new Works Council 
Agreement as a « significant step in the movement's striving for increased 
insight and influence at the enterprise level. It is without doubt the 
most important event in the field of labour-management co-operation 
since the 1946 Agreement ». i r 
The most important resuit for the unions is the fact that the Works 
Councils are now to be an intégral part of the decision-making process 
in company administration, that information and consultation has to take 
place before managerial décisions are taken not only by the executive 
management but, in important questions, aiso by company board and 
shareholders; and that the influence of the work force on personnel 
policies is being strengthened. The unions demanded that the Works 
Council should be consulted not only as to gênerai personnel policies 
but should aiso hâve the right of advance consultation in individual cases, 
such as transfers and promotions. This was strongly resisted by the 
employers and, in the end, not included. This does not mean, however, 
any curtailment in the right of the local trade-union représentation to 
take up personnel questions with management. 
(16) Ibid, page 11. 
(17) Ibid, page 2. 
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The Works Council Agreement as well as the Co-operation Agree-
ment is obviously a compromise. It is clear that the new Agreements 
de not seek to curtail the right of final décision of management, despite 
the fact that they prescribe — or better, express the hope — that 
décisions affecting manpower should corne about by consensus. The 
question of whether under the new Agreements change itself rather 
than the effects of change hâve become « negotiable » does not seem 
to be regarded as of décisive importance. It is argued that if the 
process of advance consultation is properly used, and if the work force 
lias the right to make alternative suggestions, the employer will automa-
tically introduce changes only on the basis of well-prepared and well-
reasoned advance planning. Moreover, the Swedish unions are by their 
own policies committed to the promotion of technical progress and 
structural change. They are fully aware that change can bring about 
individual inconvenience and even individu al hardships. For tliis the 
individual enterprise can only be made responsible up to a point; for 
the rest public policy has to step in. 
Whether or not the Swedish trade-union movement will be satisfied 
in the longer run with the degree of influence on managerial décisions 
obtained in the new Agreements, will very much dépend on what 
actually happens in the future. A certain note of skepticism may be 
discerned in the concluding statement of the Report of the LO Working 
Group to the 1966 Congress: 
« The way in which change is carried out will be of décisive impor-
tance for the way the employers will react... 
« By the récent revision of the Works Council Agreement new possi-
bilités hâve been opened up for widening the area of consultation on 
change. We express the hope that good use will be made of thèse 
possibilities in the future. In our opinion, hmoever, consultation on an 
equal footing can hardly corne about as long as the clause about the 
employers' exclusive right to lead and assign work as well as to freely 
hire and fire workers remains in collective agreements. » 18 
(18) Op. cit., page 237. 
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LES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES ET LES CHANGEMENTS 
TECHNOLOGIQUES: ACCORDS ET ATTITUDE 
DU PATRONAT ET DES SYNDICATS SUEDOIS 
Depuis un quart de siècle, la pensée syndicale en Suède est dominée par la 
question des changements. Au congrès de 1941 de la Confédération suédoise des 
syndicats ( L O ) , l'attention a été centrée sur le nouveau rôle des syndicats dans 
l'Etat-Providence. Au congrès de 1951, l'accent a été placé sur le problème de la 
politique des salaires dans des conditions de plein emploi et on en est arrivé à 
un régime centralisé de négociation collective applicable à l'ensemble du pays. 
En 1961, a surgi la question de changements structurels et technologiques comme 
prérequis d'une croissance économique stable et d'une hausse constante du niveau 
de vie. On a alors commencé à penser que les syndicats ne pouvaient plus se 
contenter d'accepter passivement le changement, mais qu'ils devaient travailler 
activement à le stimuler. 
Ce n'est donc pas par pure coïncidence qu'au même congrès, la LO a égale-
ment abordé la question du rôle et de la fonction des travailleurs et de leurs 
représentants dans la prise des décisions au niveau de l'entreprise. Elle a soutenu 
que pour accepter une part de responsabilité dans la stimulation des changements, 
les syndicats devaient nécessairement, au cours de la mise en oeuvre de ces chan-
gements, avoir la faculté et l'occasion de protéger les intérêts de leurs membres, 
non seulement du point de vue matériel, mais aussi des points de vue social et 
proprement humain. 
Cependant, à l'époque, on ne possédait guère de renseignements exacts au 
sujet de la nature des changements et de leurs conséquences possibles sur les tra-
vailleurs. La LO a donc formé un groupe de travail chargé de faire les études 
nécessaires. Ce groupe a publié son rapport en mai 1966, à temps pour le congrès 
de la LO de la même année. Il y déclarait que même dans le cas d'une forte 
accélération des changements technologiques et structurels, les répercussions sur 
l'emploi en général seraient sans doute assez limitées. Quant aux changements 
technologiques comme tels, le groupe opinait qu'il était difficile en théorie et 
impossible en pratique d'isoler la « technologie » des autres causes de changement. 
Il fallait donc considérer le changement comme un tout complexe, qu'il fût possible 
ou non de le rattacher à la « nouvelle technologie ». 
D'autre part, le groupe signalait qu'un haut niveau général d'emploi peut dissi-
muler de graves écarts entre les secteurs particuliers et que le changement, même 
s'il n'a pas de graves répercussions sur l'ensemble de l'emploi, peut avoir des 
conséquences dramatiques pour certaines entreprises, industries, ou régions géogra-
phiques ainsi que pour certains particuliers. La nécessité s'imposait donc d'ajouter 
comme complément à la politique de plein emploi certains éléments bien choisis 
de politique active du marché du travail. 
Au sujet du rôle de la main-d'oeuvre, le groupe de la LO a formulé diverses 
recommandations. Les changements technologiques et structurels ne sont pas com-
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mandés par des « lois naturelles » et, dans chaque cas, il y a un choix possible. 
Le travailleur ou employé en tant que salarié doit toujours être au centre des 
préoccupations et alors la nécessité s'impose d'établir un juste équilibre entre 
deux facteurs : d'une part, le problème d'adaptation de la part du particulier et, 
d'autre part, l'accroissement possible de l'efficacité économique. Toutefois, les 
discussions à ce sujet sont vaines si elles ne tiennent pas compte de tout le processus 
de la prise des décisions. Les travailleurs ont donc le droit de réclamer de l'admi-
nistration les renseignements et las données dont ils ont besoin pour juger de leur 
propre situation ainsi que les conséquences pour eux-mêmes des changements et 
agir selon les circonstances. Toutefois, il ne leur suffit pas d'être renseignés. Ils 
doivent aussi avoir la possibilité d'influer sur la façon dont les changements sont 
effectués et sur les résultats de ces changements. Le groupe concluait donc à 
Fà-propos d'un accroissement de l'influence des syndicats sur la politique de 
l'entreprise. « Ainsi l'objectif traditionnel des syndicats d'en arriver à une démocra-
tisation de plus en plus poussée de la vie industrielle gardait toute son actualité ». 
La question de la « démocratie économique » préoccupe depuis très longtemps 
les esprits en Suède, bien que l'expression n'ait jamais été clairement définie. Après 
la Première Guerre mondiale la « démocratie économique » a été surtout considérée 
comme un corollaire de la démocratie parlementaire. Cependant, le long règne du 
parti social-démocratique auquel la majorité des syndicats industriels du pays sont 
liés organiquement a semblé démontrer l'efficacité du pouvoir politique sur l'éco-
nomie et graduellement on en est venu à considérer plus précisément comme 
objectif des syndicats un accroissement de l'influence des travailleurs au niveau 
de l'administration des entreprises. 
Une des grandes caractéristiques du régime suédois de relations industrielles 
réside dans le fait que les deux parties comptent aussi peu que possible sur la 
législation, mais cherchent plutôt dans des ententes volontaires conclues par leurs 
organismes centraux respectifs les moyens de régler leurs conflits. Ces ententes 
nationales remontent à la première décennie du siècle actuel. Cependant, ce n'est 
que depuis 1938, alors que, après des dizaines d'années de grands conflits indus-
triels et de menaces d'intervention de la part du Gouvernement, la Confédération 
suédoise des employeurs ( SAF ) et la LO en sont arrivées à leur fameux « Accord 
fondamental », que les ententes nationales sont devenues le moyen d'assurer gra-
duellement des cadres institutionnels aux relations patronales-ouvrières. Toutefois, 
ces accords ne sont pas des ententes collectives proprement dites, mais simplement 
des recommandations aux organismes affiliés. Ils ne le deviennent que sur ratifi-
cation par les fédérations et les associations compétentes. 
Si l'on fait abstraction de la clause de sécurité de l'emploi contenue dans 
« l'Accord fondamental » de 1938, la première tentative en faveur de la démo-
cratie industrielle date de l'Accord de 1946 sur les comités d'entreprise. Après 
quinze années d'efforts de la part des organismes des deux côtés, il a fallu recon-
naître que ces comités mixtes de patrons et de travailleurs au niveau de l'entreprise 
n'avaient guère contribué à l'amélioration des relations patronales-ouvrières. Cette 
conclusion a été confirmée par des études faites entre 1961 et 1965 par les trois 
organismes en cause, la SAF, la LO et l'Organisation centrale des employés ( T C O ) . 
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Du point de vue syndical, le fait le plus inquiétant était que dans la plupart des 
cas étudiés par la LO les travailleurs se plaignaient de n'être mis au courant des 
changements importants dans le fonctionnement de l'entreprise et les conditions 
de travail qu'après la prise de la décision définitive par l'administration. 
A la lumière de ces études, les syndicats membres de la LO en sont venus à 
la conclusion qu'il ne suffisait pas de modifier partiellement de l'Accord sur les 
comités d'entreprise, comme on l'avait fait jusque là, mais qu'il fallait en arriver 
à un accord entièrement nouveau. 
La Confédération des employeurs a consenti à des négociations en ce sens 
malgré une certaine crainte, semblait-il, que les syndicats ne soulèvent la question 
de la codétermination sous une forme de participation plus directe à la haute 
direction. Il n'en a été rien, cependant. Les négociations entre la SAF, d'une part, 
et la LO et la TCO, d'autre part, ont abouti à la conclusion, en août 1966, de 
trois nouveaux accords notionaux : 
( i) Un nouvel accord sur les comités d'entreprises, aux termes duquel ces 
comités sont des organismes mixtes, dont les membres du côté patronal 
sont nommés par le patron et ceux du côté des travailleurs sont élus 
par les travailleurs selon des règles établies par le syndicat local. Les 
comités d'entreprise sont définis comme étant « des organismes de ren-
seignement et de consultation entre le patron et les travailleurs repré-
sentés par leur syndicat dans l'entreprise ». L'accord, qui vise à faire 
de ces comités des éléments réguliers des rouages administratifs de 
l'entreprise et du processus de décisions, précise en toutes lettres que 
par renseignement et consultation il faut entendre des renseignements 
et des consultations préalables. 
(H) Le deuxième des nouveaux accords vient des employeurs. Intitulé 
« Accord sur les questions de collaboration au niveau de l'entreprise », 
il établit les principes généraux de la collaboration patronale-ouvrière 
au niveau de l'entreprise comme principes directeurs des comités d'en-
treprise. Il prévoit également l'établissement, au niveau national, d'un 
nouvel organisme représentatif des trois grandes centrales (SAF, LO, 
TCO ) ayant un double objectif : la recherche et la formation des mem-
bres des comités d'entreprise. C'est également cet organisme qui est 
chargé de diriger et de stimuler l'activité des comités d'entreprise. En 
outre, il est expressément reconnu que les ententes institutionnelles 
auront d'autant plus de succès qu'elles seront directement adaptées à 
la structure administrative particulière de l'entreprise en cause, ce qui 
laisse aux parties au niveau local le soin d'améliorer, de compléter ou 
même de remplacer l'accord général sur les comités d'entreprise, sous 
réserve de l'approbation des organismems compétents au niveau de 
l'industrie. 
( iii ) De longues années d'expérience ayant démontré que la signature d'accords 
ne suffit pas pour assurer la réalisation du régime des comités d'entre-
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prise, il a été reconnu que la bonne exécution de l'accord exigeait 
beaucoup de travail de formation des membres de ces comités. Il a donc 
été convenu par les organismes supérieurs de recommander à leurs 
filiales de faire de cette formation une partie régulière de l'activité des 
entreprises et, en particulier, du programme de formation du personnel 
de la société. La question du coût sera réglée au cours de discussions 
entre les organismes en cause dans chaque industrie. 
Malgré qu'il apparaisse aux syndicats comme « l'événement le plus important 
dans le domaine de la collaboration patronale-ouvrière depuis l'Accord de 1946 », 
l'Accord de 1966 sur les comités d'entreprise constitue manifestement un compro-
mis. Il est évident aussi que les nouveaux accords ne visent pas à entraver les droits 
du patron de prendre la décision finale, même s'il est prévu — ou plutôt que 
l'espoir soit exprimé — que les décisions touchant la main-d'oeuvre seront prises 
du consentement général. Une certaine note de scepticisme semble se glisser 
dans les dernières phrases du Rapport du Groupe de travail au congrès de la LO, 
où il est dit que « des consultations d'égal à égal ne seront guère possibles tant 
que sera maintenue dans les ententes collectives la clause accordant aux employeurs 
le droit exclusif de diriger et de répartir le travail et d'engager et de congédier 
librement les travailleurs ». 
